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Ill. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from a dispute involving a Stock Subscription and Cross 
Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") between shareholders of H&M Distribution, Inc. 
(the "Company"). The appellant John Kugler ("Kugler") sought damages against the 
respondent Ron Nelson ("Nelson"), as well as other named defendants for breach of the 
Agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
After being served with the Complaint, Nelson brought a Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion"), seeking summary judgment on two grounds: (1) there was no 
evidence that Nelson, as a purchaser of stock, breached the Agreement; and (2) that 
the statute of limitations had run, thereby precluding Kugler's Complaint. After multiple 
continuances and delays, sought by Kugler, a hearing was held on the Motion on March 
28, 2011. At this hearing, the Court granted the Motion, and dismissed Nelson from the 
case, and subsequently issued a Rule 54(b) certificate certifying the judgment as final. 
Shortly thereafter, Nelson filed a Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Fees 
(the "Motion for Fees") and Kugler filed a Motion to Reconsider. After a hearing, the 
Court denied Kugler's Motion to Reconsider and granted the Motion for Fees, again 
issuing a rule 54(b) certificate, certifying the judgment as final. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
A. Factual Overview 
In April of 2002, Nelson signed an Assumption and Ratification Agreement, 
agreeing to be bound by the terms of the Agreement. 1 The Agreement provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
No shareholder shall encumber of dispose of all or any part of the shares 
in the corporation to which he has now subscribed or may hereafter 
acquire, without the written consent of all the other shareholders, or, in the 
absence of such written consent, without first giving to all the other 
shareholders and to the corporation at least sixty (60) days written notice 
of his intention to make any such disposition. Within the sixty (60) day 
period, a meeting of the shareholders shall be called by the corporation, of 
which all the shares of the shareholder desiring to make any such 
disposition shall be offered for sale and shall be subject to the option on 
the part of each of the other shareholders to purchase a proportionate 
share, at the same price offered by a bona fide prospective purchase of 
such shares. If any shareholder entitled to purchase shares fails to accept 
his ratable offer, either in whole or in part, any other such shareholder may 
purchase the shares not so accepted. In the event all the shares so 
offered for sale are not purchased by the other shareholders, then all 
restrictions imposed by this agreement upon such shares shall terminate 
forthwith.2 
On February 2, 2005, Nelson agreed to purchase twenty shares of stock in the 
Company from the Company. 3 On May 2, 2005, Nelson purchased twenty shares of 
stock from the Company.4 
8. Procedural Overview 
On May 6, 2010, Kugler filed his Complaint against Nelson alleging that Nelson, 
by acquiring these shares of stock, somehow breached the Agreement. 5 However, 
Nelson was not personally served with a copy of the Complaint until November 4, 
1 R. P. 32. 
2 R. P. 34 (emphasis added). 
3 R.P.19. 
4 R.P.19. 
5 R. P. 11-12. 
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2010.6 On November 17, 2010, Nelson filed his Answer and Demand for Jury Trial (the 
"Answer"), as well as the Motion, a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Affidavit of Ron Nelson in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (the 
"Nelson Affidavit"). 7 On November 19, 2010, Nelson filed his Notice of Hearing, 
advising Kugler that a hearing date was set on January 3, 2011 .8 
On December 20, 2010, Kugler filed his Affidavit Opposing Summary Judgment 
and Supporting Leave to Amend (the "First Kugler Affidavit"), as well as his Motion for 
Leave to Amend.9 On December 27, 2010, Nelson filed his Motion to Strike Affidavit 
Opposing Summary Judgment and Supporting Leave to Amend, as well as his Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 10 
On December 29, 2010, a mere two business days before the hearing, Kugler 
filed his first Motion to Continue the summary judgment hearing, and an Affidavit in 
Support of a Motion for Continuance. 11 On such day, Kugler also contacted Nelson's 
counsel and advised her of his need for a continuance. 12 During this conversation, 
Nelson's counsel advised Kugler that while she would not stipulate to a continuance, as 
an accommodation, she would have no objection to Kugler making an appearance at 
the hearing via telephone. 13 In addition, on December 30, 2010, Kugler filed his Second 
Affidavit (the "Second Kugler Affidavit"). 14 Despite the foregoing, at the hearing on 
January 3, 2011, Kugler failed to appear, either in person or by telephone. 15 
6 R.P. 7. 
7 R. P. 6-7, 18-19. 
8 R. P. 6-7. 
9 R. P. 7, 23-25. 
10 R. P. 7. 
11 R. P. 7, 26-27 
12 Tr. P. 7, LL. 6-25. 
13 Tr. P. 7, LL. 6-25. 
14 R. 7, Tr. P. 10, L. 25, P. 11, LL. 1-3. 
15 Tr. P. 6, LL. 7-18, P. 9, LL. 7-11. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5 -
Nonetheless, the district court, in an exercise of caution, granted Kugler's first Motion to 
Continue, and vacated the hearing and ordered this matter to be heard on January 31, 
2011.16 The district court made it very clear, however, that all future affidavits needed to 
be in compliance with Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and issued an 
order to that effect. 17 
On January 18, 2011, the day after Kugler's responsive pleadings were due to 
the Court, Kugler filed a second motion to continue, this time claiming he needed 
additional time to complete discovery. 18 At the hearing on January 31, 2011, the district 
court again granted Kugler's motion to continue, and rescheduled the hearing for March 
28, 2011. 19 During this hearing, the district court advised Kugler to initially focus on 
resolving any issues with amending the Complaint.20 
On February 8, 2011, Kugler served Nelson with his discovery requests. 21 On 
February 24, 2011 (sixteen days after the discovery requests were sent), Nelson served 
his answers to disc~very on Kugler.22 Likewise, on March 7, 2011, the remaining 
defendants also served their answers on Kugler.23 
On March 14, 2011 (the day Kugler's briefing responsive to the Motion was due), 
Kugler's attorney filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record (the "Motion to 
Withdraw").24 In addition, Kugler's attorney filed a Notice of Hearing on Motion to 
Withdraw as Attorney of Record, and set the hearing for the same day as Nelson's third 
16 R. P. 7, Tr. P. 10, LL 5-19, 25, P. 11, LL.1-8. 
17 Tr. P. 10, LL. P. 11, LL. 1-8. 
18 R. P. 8, P. 36-38. 
19 Tr. P. 19, LL. 11 P. 20, LL 1-25, P. 21, LL. 1-21. 
20 Tr. P. 19. LL 13-22. 
21 R. P. 8. 
22 R. P. 8. 
23 R. P. 8. 
24 R. P. 8. 
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attempt to have the Motion heard.25 At the hearing, the district court determined, given 
the various delays, that the Motion would be heard before allowing the hearing on the 
Motion to Withdraw. 26 At such hearing, the district court granted Nelson's Motion. 27 On 
April 12, 2010, the district court entered an Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which order included a 54(b) certificate certifying the order as final. 28 
On April 18, 2011, Nelson filed his Motion for Fees.29 On April 26, 2011, Kugler 
filed a Motion to Reconsider, as well as a Motion for Leave to Supplement. 30 In 
addition, on April 29, 2011, Kugler filed his Objection to Fee and Cost Claim.31 On June 
20, 2011, a hearing was held on Nelson's Motion for Fees, as well as Kugler's Motion to 
Reconsider and Motion for Leave to Supplement. 32 At this hearing, the district court 
denied Kugler's Motion to Reconsider and Motion for Leave to Supplement, and granted 
Nelson's Motion for Fees. 33 On June 21, 2011, the district court entered the Order and 
Judgment on Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees, which order included a 
54(b) certificate certifying the order as final. 34 In addition, on June 21, 2011, the district 
court entered the Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Supplement, 
which order also included a 54(b) certificate certifying the order as final. 35 
2" "R. P. 8. 
26 Tr. P. 29, LL. 9-19. 
27 Tr. P. 39, LL. 1-25, P. 40, LL. 1-24. 
28 R. P. 9, P. 46-48. 
29 R. P. 9. 
30 R. P. 9. 
31R.P.9. 
32 R. P. 9, Tr. P. 43, LL.1-21. 
33 Tr. P. 54, LL. 17-23, P.65, L. 25, P. 66, LL. 1-5. 
34 R. P. 9, P. 49-51. 
35 R. P. 9, P. 52-54. 








IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the district court correct in granting the respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
Did the appellant have an adequate opportunity to amend his Complaint? 
Did the Order Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney meet procedural requirements? 
Was the district court's decision to deny the respondent's Motion to Reconsider a 
proper exercise of discretion? 
Was the district court's decision to issue a 54(b) certificate to certify that its 
judgment was final a proper exercise of its discretion? 
\/\fas the district court's decision to order appellant to pay respondent's attorney's 
fees a proper exercise of its discretion? 
Is respondent entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal? 
V. ARGUMENT 
Kugler's appellant's brief is replete with conclusory statements that are not 
supported by the record or authority. Idaho courts have refused to consider an issue 
not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Bach v. Bagley, 148 
Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 11 (2010). Likewise, if an "issue is only mentioned in 
passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered 
by this Court." Id. 
A. Was the district court correct in granting the respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
In this matter, the district court determined that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact in the record, and as such granted summary judgment to Nelson on all 
issues. Nelson respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's findings with 
regards to summary judgment. 
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1. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Samuel v. 
Hepworth, Nungester& Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303,306 (2000). The 
non-moving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. "If the party does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party." I.R.C.P. 56(e) 
(emphasis added). 
2. Kugler has failed to affirmatively identify any disputed issues of fact that 
would preclude summary judgment. 
In Kugler's appellant brief, Kugler repeatedly references facts that are not in the 
record, and were not otherwise presented to the district court. However, even if such 
facts are taken as true, Kugler has nonetheless failed to identify any facts that would 
effectively dispute either of the justifications put forth by the district court for its grant of 
summary judgment. 
a Kugler's own actions led to the grant of summary judgment. 
This matter has been riddled with delay since its inception. Kugler filed the 
Complaint on May 6, 2010, but failed to serve Nelson until November 4, 2010, nearly six 
months later. 36 Moreover, Kugler was granted multiple continuances and extensions of 
36 R. P. 6-7. 
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time to respond to the Motion. 37 In fact, at the January 31, 2011 hearing, the district 
court expressly advised Kugler that "Based on the moving papers, I have to state clearly 
that the burden has shifted back to the plaintiffs in this case to justify a continuation of 
this case, so respond appropriately."38 
Despite the foregoing, each time Kugler's responsive pleadings to the Motion 
were due, Kugler sought a delay. First, Kugler sought a delay because he was unable 
to travel to Twin Falls, ldaho.39 Subsequently, Kugler sought a delay because he 
wanted additional discovery.4° Finally, Kugler sought a delay, because he instructed his 
attorney not to file responsive pleadings and sought withdrawal of his attorney. 41 
Simply, every time Kugler was called on to answer Nelson's Motion, he refused. 
Kugler cannot now allege that he was somehow prejudiced by his own failures to timely 
comply with the district court's repeated efforts to accommodate Kugler. 
b Kugler is precluded from raising arguments to this Court that he failed to 
raise to the district court. 
The appellate court's review is "limited to the evidence, theories and arguments 
that were presented" at the district court level. Obenchain v. McA/vain Construction, 
Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443,444 (2006). As such, it is well established that 
this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Kraly v. 
Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 208 P.3d 281 (2009) (refusing to consider a judicial estoppel 
argument as it was not raised at the trial court level); and Johannson v. Utterbeck, 146 
Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (refusing to consider appellant's argument of jury misconduct, 
as it was not raised below). 
37 R. P. 7-9, Tr. P.10, LL. 16-24, P. 20, LL. 11-25, P. 21, LL. 1-13. 
38 Tr. P. 21, LL. 10-13 (emphasis added). 
39 R. P. 26-27. 
40 R. P. 36-38. 
41 R. P. 41-42, Tr. P. 25, LL. 7-10. 
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Throughout Kugler's brief, Kugler repeatedly references facts and arguments that 
were never argued to the district court. Such arguments include, without limitation, the 
following: Kugler's argument that the statute of limitations adopted by the district court 
does not apply; Kugler's argument that Nelson waived his statute of limitation argument; 
and Kugler's argument that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until Kugler 
incurred damage. 
Kugler had ample opportunity to raise these arguments at the trial court level. 
The Motion was set for hearing on three different occasions, and yet Kugler failed to 
raise these issues even once. Moreover, Kugler could have raised these issues at the 
hearing on his Motion to Reconsider, but once again failed to make these arguments. 
Simply, Kugler failed to make these arguments before the district court, and is not 
allowed to make such arguments now. As such, this Court should wholly disregard 
each of the above-described arguments, as they are not properly before the Court. 
C There are no genuine issues of material fact establishing that Nelson had 
any duty to provide notice to Kugler prior to purchasing the shares. 
Kugler has never alleged any facts that would support his claim for breach of 
contract against Nelson. Kugler has failed to ever allege any facts, or the existence of 
any agreement, that put any burden on Nelson, as a purchaser of shares, to provide 
any notice to third parties prior to buying such shares. Specifically, the Complaint 
alleges as follows: 
At the time of or after each acquired stock in the corporation each 
individual executed a stockholders agreement restricting the sale of stock 
and requiring each and every stockholder to first offer his shares for sale 
to the other stock owners, in accord with his pro rata percentage interest. 
Additionally any stockholder was permitted to acquire any of the stock that 
was not acquired by the other remaining stockholders.42 
42 R. P. 11-12 (emphasis added). 
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The substance of the Agreement, as alleged by Kugler, requires the owner of the 
shares to offer his shares to the other stockholders before selling them to anyone else. 
Kugler has not alleged that the Agreement requires a purchaser to acquire shareholder 
approval or take any other action prior to purchasing such shares. In fact, the Nelson 
Affidavit (which is unrefuted) affirmatively establishes that Nelson has never entered 
into any agreement that would require him to obtain shareholder approval prior to 
purchasing shares.43 
In addition, the record supports Nelson's reading of the Agreement, which 
provides as follows: 
No shareholder shall encumber of dispose of all or any part of the shares 
in the corporation to which he has now subscribed or may hereafter 
acquire, without the written consent of all the other shareholders, or, in the 
absence of such written consent, without first giving to all the other 
shareholders and to the corporation at least sixty (60) days written notice 
of his intention to make any such disposition. Within the sixty (60) day 
period, a meeting of the shareholders shall be called by the corporation, of 
which all the shares of the shareholder desiring to make any such 
disposition shall be offered for sale and shall be subject to the option on 
the part of each of the other shareholders to purchase a proportionate 
share, at the same price offered by a bona fide prospective purchase of 
such shares. If any shareholder entitled to purchase shares fails to accept 
his ratable offer, either in whole or in part, any other such shareholder may 
purchase the shares not so accepted. In the event all the shares so 
offered for sale are not purchased by the other shareholders, then all 
restrictions imposed by this agreement upon such shares shall terminate 
forthwith.44 
Simply, the Agreement requires each shareholder to put the other shareholders on 
notice if such shareholder intends to sell or otherwise dispose of his shares. There is 
43 R. P. 19 ("I have never entered into an agreement that would require me to provide written notice or otherwise 
obtain any sort of approval prior to purchasing shares of the Company"). 
44 R. P. 34 (emphasls added). 
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nothing in the record that would require Nelson, as a purchaser of such shares to 
proviae the shareholders with such notice. 
Rather, the Agreement places the duty to take any action on the party actually 
selling the shares, not on the party purchasing shares. As Kugler has failed to allege 
any facts which would suggest that Nelson, as purchaser of shares, had any obligations 
whatsoever, Kugler cannot establish that Nelson breached such obligations. As such, 
summary judgment against Kugler should be affirmed. 
To the extent Kugler is attempting to raise a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, 
such claim simply was never pied. The Complaint expressly alleges that "Plaintiff has 
been damaged by each of the defendants [sic] breach of the stockholder 
agreement..."45 Moreover, even the First Kugler Affidavit, which was filed in support of 
Kugler's motion to amend the Complaint makes absolutely no mention of allegations of 
breach of fiduciary duty. Even under the most liberal reading of Kugler's filings, he has 
simply failed to allege any claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Based on the foregoing, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment 
to Nelson and against Kugler should be affirmed. 
d The undisputed evidence establishes that the applicable statute of 
limitations had run prior to Kugler filing the Complaint. 
Idaho Code § 5-201 states that civil actions may only be commenced "within the 
periods described in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued." Idaho 
Code§ 5-216 establishes that an action upon any contract, obligation or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing must be brought within five years. "A cause of 
action for breach of contract accrues upon the breach even though no damage may 
45 R. P. 12 (emphasis added). 
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occur until later." Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 
853 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The undisputed evidence establishes that the Complaint was filed on May 6, 
2010.46 Nelson agreed to purchase twenty shares of stock in the Company on February 
2, 2005, more than five years before Kugler filed the Complaint.47 Likewise, Nelson's 
purchase was finalized on May 2, 2005, also more than five years before Kugler filed 
the Complaint. 48 
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that any alleged breach occurred as early as 
February 2, 2005 and no later than May 2, 2005. Because more than five years have 
elapsed since either of these dates, the statute of limitations on this cause of action had 
run at the time Kugler filed his Complaint. 
Kugler appears to now allege that this statute is not applicable for three reasons: 
(1) that the district court failed to state on what statute it was granting summary 
judgment; (2) that Nelson somehow waived his claim to assert a statute of limitations 
defense; and (3) that Kugler did not incur damage until September 30, 2005, thereby 
causing the statute to begin running on such date. However, as discussed above, 
Kugler failed to allege any of these arguments at the district court level, and therefore 
such arguments cannot be considered on appeal. 
Even assuming Kugler's arguments were properly before this Court, they 
nonetheless have no merit. At the hearing on March 28, 2011, Nelson's attorney, 
Kugler's attorney and the district court each referenced Idaho Code§ 5-216, as the 
46 R. P. 6, 11. 
47 R. P. 19. 
48 R. P. 19. 
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applicable statute of limitations, and knew precisely which statute was at issue.49 As 
such, Kugler's allegation that the district court failed to specify what statute it was 
relying on is without merit. 
In addition, Kugler's argument that Nelson waived any claims to make a statute 
of limitations defense is likewise meritless. In the Answer, Nelson stated that his fifth 
defense was that "Kugler's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations."50 
Likewise, Nelson's tenth defense advised the Court that Nelson reserved the right to 
assert additional affirmative defenses once discovery was completed. 51 More 
importantly, Nelson filed the Motion, and its accompanying memorandum on the same 
date that Nelson filed the Answer. 52 Such documentation clearly laid out that Nelson 
was relying on Idaho Code§ 5-216 as the applicable statute of limitations. 
Finally, Kugler's allegations that he did not incur damage until September 30, 
2005 is likewise meritless. Idaho case law is clear that a "cause of action for breach of 
contract accrues upon breach even though no damage may occur until later." Mason, 
125 Idaho at 436 (emphasis added). As such, the date upon which Kugler alleges he 
incurred damage is irrelevant. 
Based on the foregoing, there are simply no issues of material fact that would 
preclude summary judgment based on Idaho Code§ 5-216. The district court's 
decision on this matter should be affirmed. 
49 Tr. P. 34, LL. 9-10, P. 35, LL. 16-24, P. 40, LL. 5-10. 
50 R.P.15. 
51 R. P. 15. 
52 R. P. 6-7. 
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B. Did the appellant have an adequate opportunity to amend his Complaint? 
Kugler appears to allege that the district court somehow erred in not allowing 
Kugler to amend his Complaint. However, Kugler's failure to amend the Complaint was 
solely a result of Kugler's failure to follow the district court's instructions, and Kugler's 
express instructions to his attorney not to file the amended complaint. 53 
1. Standard of Review on a Motion to Amend 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a), "a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party." Such leave should not be granted where 
the new claims proposed fail to state a valid claim. Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. 
Fatmers Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 318,325,971 P.2d 1142, 1149 (1998). An order denying 
a motion to amend will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Hinkle v. Winey, 
126 Idaho 993, 997, 895 P.2d 594, 598 (Ct App. 1995). 
2. The undisputed evidence establishes that Kugler had multiple 
opportunities to amend his Complaint and failed to do so. 
On December 20, 2010, Kugler filed his Motion for Leave to Amend, and the First 
Kugler Affidavit. 54 Subsequently, Kugler filed the Second Kugler Affidavit.55 Kugler 
sought to amend his Complaint to include allegations of events that occurred in 2009 
and 2010 concerning Nelson's sale of his stock.56 However, such affidavits provided 
very little guidance to either the district court or Nelson as to what claims he sought to 
add.57 As such, at the January 3, 2011 hearing, the district court expressed concern 
over these procedural defects.58 
53 Tr. P. 24, LL. 18-24, P. 25, LL. 7-10. 
54 R. P. 7, 23. 
55 R. P 28-31. 
56 R. P. 23-31. 
57 R. P. 23-31. 
58 Tr. P. 9, LL. 20-22. 
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Subsequently, Kugler hired counsel to assist him in this matter.59 At the hearing 
on January 31, 2011, the district court advised Kugler's counsel as follows: 
One, there is a motion pending to amend the complaint in this case to 
further plead what Mr. Kugler claims is his cause of action. That matter 
has never been ruled on one way or the other. Mr. Gadd, I think you need 
to examine that issue first because the pleadings in this case are woefully 
inadequate and it would certainly help frame the issues here to find out 
exactly the time frame in which this claimed cause of action arose so we 
could deal with the statute of limitations issue.60 
However, by the time the March 28, 2011 hearing arrived, Kugler had still failed to either 
file a renewed motion to amend that complied with the procedural requirements, or to 
file an amended complaint.61 As such, the district court addressed this failure as 
follows: 
THE COURT: There was a motion granted to allow him to file an amended 
complaint in this case. That has never happened. Is there a comment on 
that? 
MR. GADD: There is, Your Honor. I'm trying to determine what I can and 
cannot share with the court. I did prepare an amended complaint, but 
suffice it to say, I don't have authority to file that for my client ... 
*** 
THE COURT: Does that include specific instructions not to file an 
amended complaint or responsive briefing to this summary judgment 
motion? 
MR. GADD: Yes, Your Honor.62 
Simply, the district court made concerted efforts to: (1) secure a motion to amend that 
complied with the procedural requirements; and (2) secure an amended complaint. 
Such efforts were not only wholly disregarded by Kugler, but Kugler instructed his own 
attorney not to comply with such efforts. 
sg R. P. 8. 
60 Tr. P. 19, LL. 13-22 (emphasis added). 
61 R. P. 6-10. 
62 Tr. P. 24, LL. 18-24, P. 25, LL. 7-10 (emphasis added). 
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C. Did the Order Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney meet procedural requirements? 
Kugler also takes issue with the Order Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney. I.R.C.P. 
Rule 11(b)(2) allows an attorney to withdraw from representation upon leave of the 
court, after motion and notice are provided to the client. In this matter, the record 
establishes that the district court did grant Kugler's attorney Motion to Withdraw. 63 
However, this motion was not granted until after Kugler's attorney filed a written Motion 
to Withdraw, an Affidavit of David W. Gadd in Support of Motion to Withdraw as 
Attorney of Record, and a Notice of Hearing on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of 
Record, all of which were filed fourteen days before the hearing on the Motion to 
Withdraw. 64 In addition, the record is clear that Kugler's attorney did also file an 
Affidavit of Mailing Re: Order Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney, establishing that Kug!er's 
attorney did mail a copy of the Order Allowing Withdrawal as Attorney to Kugler. 65 
However, as noted by Kugler, the actual Order Allowing Withdrawal as Attorney 
is not included in the record on appeal.66 Such an order generally would not be 
included in the standard record, and Kugler never expressly requested this order.67 See 
I.A.R., Rule 28 (listing those items to be included in a standard clerk's record). 
Likewise, Kugler has made no efforts to augment the record to provide for this order. 
Idaho courts agree that the "appellant has the obligation to provide a sufficient record to 
substantiate his or her claims on appeal." Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land 
Investment, LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 751, 215 P.3d 457,471 (2009). In the absence of an 
adequate record, this Court should not presume error below. Id. 
63 R. P. 8. 
64 R. P. 8-9. 
65 R. P. 43-45. 
66 R. p 2-3. 
67 R. P. 55-56. 
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Based on the foregoing, Kugler has not provided a sufficient record to allow this 
Court to review the Order Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney and determine whether it 
made the requirements of l.R.C.P. Rule 11. 
More importantly, the whole issue as to the efficacy of the Order Allowing 
Withdrawal of Attorney is irrelevant, as the district court issued its decision on the 
Motion to Withdraw after it granted Nelson's Motion. As such, any error in the Order 
Allowing Withdrawal of Attorney was harmless, as Kugler was represented by counsel 
for the Motion. In fact, counsel argued the Motion on behalf of Kugler. 68 Likewise, 
Kugler made no efforts to continue the March 28, 2011 hearing on the Motion.69 Kugler 
never filed a motion to continue or sought an enlargement of time.70 As these options 
would have been available to Kugler, Kugler cannot now claim error based on his failure 
to do so. As such, the district court's decision on the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of 
Attorney of Record should be affirmed. 
D. Was the district court decision to deny the respondent's Motion to Reconsider a 
proper exercise of discretion? 
On April 26, 2011, Kugler filed a Motion to Reconsider and a Motion for Leave to 
Supplement. 71 Kugler asserts that it was error for the court to deny these motions. 
However, Kugler has failed to identify any new facts, evidence, or argument that would 
support a motion to reconsider. See I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) (allowing relief from a final 
judgment upon showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly 
discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentative, void judgment or other reason justifying 
relief). 
68 Tr. P. 30, LL. 4-25, P. 31, 1-4, P. 34, LL. 21-25, P. 35, LL. 1-25, P. 36, LL. 1-21. 
69 R. P. 6-9. 
70 R. P. 6-9. 
71 R. P. 9. 
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At the June 20, 2011 hearing on Kugler's motions, Kugler merely argued that he 
was denied an opportunity to argue the Motion due to various failings on the part of his 
previous attorney72. However, Kugler failed to provide the district court with any 
evidence whatsoever of these failings. Kugler did not specifically identify what his 
previous attorney failed to argue on his behalf or provide any evidence as to facts 
Kugler requested his previous attorney to present to the district court. Simply, Kugler 
failed to provide the court with any new evidence that would support his Motion to 
Reconsider or Motion to Supplement. As such, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying such motions, and the district court's decision should be affirmed. 
E. Was the district court's decision to issue a 54(b) certificate to certify that its 
judgment was final a proper exercise of its discretion? 
I.R.C.P., Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment 
upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon the 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. ... 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). The trial court judge has discretion in whether to 
issue a Rule 54(b) certicate. Willis v. Larsen, 110 Idaho 818, 822, 718 P.2d 1256, 1260 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
Despite the fact that the Rule 54(b) certificate was attached to not one, but three 
judgments in this matter, Kugler failed to ever object to the Rule 54(b) certification or to 
otherwise request the district to vacate such certification. 73 Given that Kugler had 
ample opportunities to object, he cannot now seek to have such certification set aside. 
72 Tr. P. 44, 1-18, P. 45, LL. 24-25, P. 46, LL. 1-3. 
73 R. p. 46-54. 
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See Obenchain, 143 Idaho at 57 (this Court will not consider arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal). 
More importantly, Kugler has failed to identify any authority or make any 
argument specifying how the district court abused its discretion in granting the Rule 
54(b) certificate. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153 (2010) 
(if an issue is not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be 
considered by this Court). 
There is ample evidence that the Rule 54(b) certificate was appropriate in this 
matter. All claims against Nelson had been dismissed, but there were multiple other 
unrelated parties still in the litigation. Nelson should not have to postpone finality in this 
matter waiting for claims wholly unrelated to him were finalized. As such, it was proper 
for the district court to grant a Rule 54(b) certificate. 
F. Was the district court's decision to order appellant to pay respondent's attorney's 
fees a proper exercise of its discretion? 
Nelson was awarded costs and attorney's fees, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) and 
54(e)(1), as the prevailing party in this matter. Specifically, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) defines 
a prevailing party as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. 
There is little dispute that Nelson prevailed in this matter at the trial court level. Nelson 
successfully defended all of the claims Kugler brought against Nelson. 
In addition, Nelson was awarded fees pursuant to the Agreement and Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(3). "Where there is a valid contract between the parties which contains 
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a provision for an award of attorney fees and costs, the terms of that contractual 
provision establish a right to an award of attorney fees and costs." Farm Credit of 
Spokane v. WW Farms, Inc., 122 Idaho 565,836 P.2d 511 (1992) (emphasis added). 
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provides as follows: 
In the event that any of the parties to this agreement are required to 
maintain an action for the enforcement of the same, then the losing party 
shall be required to pay reasonable attorney fee in such proceeding.74 
Kugler brought this action against Nelson alleging that Kugler breached the Agreement. 
As Nelson successfully defeated all claims against him, this provision of the Agreement 
applies and attorney's fees should be awarded to Nelson. 
Likewise, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In any civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction ... , the 
prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees to be set by 
the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household purposes. 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) (emphasis added). 
In this matter, Kugler brought a cause of action alleging a breach of a contract 
governing the sale of stock. As such, this transaction meets the mandates of Idaho 
Code§ 12-120, in that it was a commercial transaction. In addition, this sale of stock 
was the gravaman of the action. Although Kugler may allege that breach of fiduciary 
duty was the gravaman of the action, the express language of the Complaint alleges 
that Nelson breached the Agreement. Given the mandatory language of Idaho Code § 
12-120(3), coupled with the fact that Nelson successfully defended all claims against 
74 R. P. 25 (emphasis added). 
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him, an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to this section was required and 
proper. The award of costs and should be affirmed. 
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Nelson requests his costs incurred in responding to this appeal pursuant to Idaho 
law, including I.AR 40, and all reasonable attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this 
appeal pursuant to Idaho law, including I.AR 41 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-
121. As this is a contract for the sale of stock, and a commercial transaction is the 
gravaman of the action, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates an award of costs and fees 
on appeal, as well as at trial. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430,438, 64 P.3d 959, 967 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
Likewise, Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides that in "any civil action, the judge may 
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties." In addition, I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(1) states that such fees may be awarded when the Court finds '1from the facts 
presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." 
In this case, Kugler brought an action against Nelson that was outside of the 
applicable statute of limitations (Idaho Code§ 5-216). In addition, Kugler's cause of 
action failed to allege any facts which, if proven, would establish that Nelson breached 
the Agreement. Moreover, short of repeated delays, Kugler failed to offer any 
meaningful response to the Motion. Likewise, this appeal has been pursued frivolously 
and without foundation. Kugler's appellant's brief is replete with conclusory statements 
that are not supported by argument or authority. Likewise, Kugler has repeatedly 
attempted to raise arguments on appeal he never raised at trial. 
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Based on the foregoing, it is evident that Kugler's efforts to bring this appeal 
against Nelson were unreasonable, frivolous and without foundational support in law or 
fact. Accordingly, Nelson should be awarded his attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The district court's decision to grant Nelson's Motion, dismiss Nelson from the 
case, and award Nelson his costs and fees is supported by the law and the record. 
Simply, Kugler made numerous and unnecessary delays without ever actually 
responding to Nelson's Motion. Given this, Nelson respectfully requests the Supreme 
Court to affirm the district court's decisions. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this JQ_ day of January, 2012. 
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By:{~k ~ 
Brooke B. Redmond 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _jQ_ day of January, 2012, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing document to be served, pursuant to I.AR. 34(d), 
upon the following person in the following manner: 
John B. Kugler 
2913 Galleon Ct. NE 
Tacoma, WA 98422 
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